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Boston School The Fallowness
Desegregation: of Common Ground
Robert A. Dentler
This essay scrutinizes the book by J. Anthony Lukas, Common Ground: A Turbulent
Decade in the Lives of Three American Families, to assess whether it presents a valid
and reliable account of the issues, people, and events it chronicles. The substantive
core of the book is shown to be the politics of Boston public school desegregation.
The parts played by the threefamilies in this event are dramatically portrayed but
cannot be corroborated and are not interpreted. The parts played by five major
policy leaders, when tested against other evidence, arefound to be distorted,
questionable legends woven in order to argue thatfour of thefive leaders made
flawed decisions that plunged Boston into violence. Lukas s docudramatic method of
reporting works to cloak the ignorance, fear, and hostility of the minority of citizens
in the white enclaves of Boston who initiated racial violence in the robe of civic
innocence.
Common Ground, by J. Anthony Lukas, a Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist and
former reporter for the New York Times, was published by Alfred A. Knopf and
released in September 1985 to become a best seller in the nonfiction book trade in less
than a month. Excerpts from its 659 pages were printed in advance in the Atlantic,
the Boston Observer, and the Washington Monthly. Within a week of its release,
other sections were published on the Op-Ed pages of the Boston Globe and the New
York Times. A dozen reviews appeared almost simultaneously with its release to
bookstores, and all of them contained praise. In his advance appraisal, David
Halberstam wrote, "This is a bittersweet book on the end of an American dream."
A month after publication, the Kennedy Foundation sponsored an eleven-member
panel of discussants, most of whom spoke favorably about Common Ground
following a speech by Lukas before a large audience assembled in the John F.
Kennedy Library.
Lukas began work on what David McClintick termed his masterpiece nearly ten
years ago. He counts it as seven years of work in his acknowledgments, but perhaps
Lukas took three years off altogether in the course of the decade that has passed since
he began the book. Besides the support he received through an advance from Knopf,
Lukas was aided by a Guggenheim fellowship, a Harvard fellowship, and lectureships
and adjunct professorships at Harvard and at Boston University. Common Ground is
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intended as a major work in journalistic reporting. In his advance praise, Joe McGin-
niss called it "a monumental achievement; a profoundly significant book." Such a
book merits close scrutiny— the aim of this essay.
My interest in Common Ground is professional as well as scholarly. Before coming
to Boston in 1972 as dean of education at Boston University, I had worked on twelve
northern school desegregation cases, and before joining Judge W. Arthur Garrity, Jr.,
in January 1975 as one of two experts he appointed to help plan and oversee his court
orders, I had consulted with Mayor Kevin White, Governor Francis Sargent, and
State Education Commissioner Gregory Anrig, independently of the court. Anthony
Lukas sought me out as a source in 1976, and I spent many hours answering his
questions. The policy issue for me, therefore, is whether Common Ground provides
an accurate account of the turbulent decade it aspires to chronicle.
The Chairwoman
It is difficult to understand initially what Common Ground is about. Lukas provides
no introduction or preface and no index by which to scan its concrete topics, and the
flow of his prose is unimpeded by citations from sources of evidence. His two-
paragraph Author's Note speaks of capturing "the realities of urban America, when
seen through the lives of actual city dwellers." This and the subtitle, A Turbulent
Decade in the Lives of Three American Families, bring to mind John Gunther's
books about the great cities of the world, and the Lanny Budd novels of Upton
Sinclair as well as his two-volume novel, Boston. To the social scientist, they bring
back memories of such books as The London Poor, The Shame of the Cities, Street
Corner Society, The Black Metropolis, and even Oscar Lewis's Five Families.
The three families of the Divers, Twymons, and McGoffs are introduced so
straightforwardly that by the time the reader has moved a fifth of the way into
Common Ground, the point of the book appears to be the narrated story of three
households whose youngest members inhabited Boston during the years 1968 to 1978.
Chapter 9, "The Chairwoman," interrupts that impression and presents instead a
profile of the life and times of Louise Day Hicks. We meet Mrs. Hicks in the midst of
a June 1966 graduation ceremony at a junior high school in Roxbury where, as
chairwoman of the Boston School Committee, she was invited to give the
commencement address. As a result of a confrontation led by the Reverend Virgil
Wood, Boston representative of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Mrs.
Hicks was forced to flee the platform and the school. A short way into this chapter,
the reader perceives that Lukas's primary focus on race relations has been
foreshadowed throughout his opening chapters on the three families. The shadows
are so embedded in the chronicle of the times of the Kennedys, Martin Luther King,
Jr., and the civil rights revolution, however, that when first encountered they are but
a small part of what each family is experiencing. It is in the chapter on Louise Day
Hicks that the background of civil rights becomes the foreground of the book.
What was noteworthy about Mrs. Hicks's law school days at Boston University,
Lukas assures us, was her participation in a study group composed of "a Jewish girl"
and "a black" girl. This trio of close friends later came to include "an Italian girl," "a
Greek girl," and two black men; the five other black students from the class of 1955
were occasional participants. When Mrs. Hicks decided in 1961 to run for a seat on
the Boston School Committee, Lukas tells us, her brothers opposed her decision; he
also asserts that "for a politically ambitious woman, a seat on the School Committee
was the obvious office to seek." He does not explore the possibility that Mrs. Hicks,
who held an education degree and a teaching certificate and who had served as a
classroom teacher before entering law school, may have been motivated by a strong
professional interest in public education.
There is little more to her biography, for half of the chapter on the chairwoman is
devoted to her immersion in the issue of racial segregation in the public schools of
Boston, an issue raised by the local chapter of the NAACP in 1963, her second year
in office and her first year as chairwoman. For Lukas, the question is what motivated
Mrs. Hicks to become the spokesperson for resistance to the demands of black
parents for equal educational opportunity for their children. "Indeed, in retrospect,
Louise seems to have acted less like a bigot than a politician on the make," he writes,
giving the reader only these two choices. She "discovered that, while her intransigence
brought denunciations from blacks and liberals, it gained still greater support in
white working-class neighborhoods." How one answers the question of motive
matters, because the answer fixes the threads of interpretation of racial policy and
conflict woven throughout Common Ground. It is conceivable, for instance, that
Louise Day Hicks was unprepared for the emergence of the segregation issue in
Boston, that she knew too little at first to understand the racial injustices of school-
policy operations, and that she believed her city was different from the cities of the
Deep South. It is equally imaginable that she initially believed she was voicing the
views of the white electorate and that their racial fears and ignorance gradually
offered her margins of support she never dreamed of mobilizing when she first ran for
office.
Social and political demography as well as intergroup history get short shrift from
Lukas. Notes on the social facts about Boston are inserted into every chapter, but
these are seldom expanded upon or integrated into interpretation; indeed, they are
subordinated to the dramaturgy of personal motives. Boston's black residents made
up less than 20 percent of the city in 1960, for example. Politicians were elected at
large, and black voters did not make up an organized political subcommunity of the
city. Four of the five members of the Boston School Committee were elected in 1961
and 1963 by white-dominated ward organizations whose members were patronized in
turn by committee members. Three members struggled to establish themselves to the
right of Louise Day Hicks on the race issue, and the issue cost Arthur Gartland, the
only moderate member, his seat. The choice before Louise Day Hicks from 1963 to
1966, then, was not between racial bigotry, as an act of personal conviction, and the
path of political expediency: the choice for four committee members, including Hicks,
was among degrees of denial concerning the facts of segregation.
At the time, there were few school committees or boards of education in the urban
Northeast that were behaving differently. There were a few school superintendents,
some groups of parents, and beleaguered moderates on boards who said that the
Brown decision of 1954 ' would come to apply to all parts of the nation. Under
pressure from the New York Board of Regents, for example, the city of White Plains
desegregated its one identifiably black public school in 1964 by converting it into a
community center. The winds of integration gusted across the cities and largest
suburbs of Pennsylvania, New York, and Connecticut in those years. A handful of
northern cities and suburbs undertook steps toward partial desegregation from 1963
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to 1968, but white resistance was so deep in each year that some civil rights leaders
turned away from this goal and embraced community control instead. As the 1960s
drew to a close, desegregationists could point with pride to White Plains, Berkeley,
Evanston, and Englewood, New Jersey, but no big-city systems had as yet reformed
their racially dual schools.
Nothing distinguished Boston less in 1964 on this issue than the intransigence of
Louise Day Hicks. There were three or more board members like her on every city
school board from Santa Barbara to Providence in that year. Neither Mrs. Hicks nor
Boston was even the northernmost case: that distinction went to Minneapolis, where
the dispute went to federal court at the close of the 1960s. The raising of the
segregation issue in 1963 and the manner of white reactions to it over the five years
that followed differed from the same phenomena in dozens of other cities only in
g4 regard to timing. The debate in Boston was comparatively belated, and it was insular
in scope, failing to draw heavily on the experience of other urban school systems.
In his chapter on Louise Day Hicks, Lukas also develops his assumptions about
the Massachusetts Racial Imbalance Act. He characterizes it as the product of "moral
fervor" engendered by the "outrages of Selma . . . [and] Martin Luther King's
impassioned address on the Boston Common." The coalition of suburban and rural
legislators who passed it, Lukas claims, were happy to point a finger at the cities.
"Few paused to wonder whether the moral imperatives of the Southern civil rights
struggle could be applied mechanically to a Northern city where segregation had
developed differently," Lukas writes, but he does not document, let alone identify, the
alleged difference.
Lukas also asserts that the authors of the Racial Imbalance Act did not pause to
ask "whether quality education might not be possible in a predominantly black
school." In fact, that question was debated in the course of framing the law. The
question had also been the topic of continual research, conferencing, and
experimentation among educators and social scientists since the Brown decision, and
it had been treated often in the newspapers of the day. What is more, no legislation
passed in Massachusetts without a coalition among suburban and rural legislators.
Racial segregation was an urban issue raised by black parents who were concentrated
in the cities of the state. Their leaders took it to the legislature. And there was
nothing mechanical about the new law. It simply adopted the rule of thumb that
identified public schools enrolling more than 50 percent nonwhite students as racially
imbalanced, a rule followed in other parts of the country at that time. This definition
had drawbacks, but mechanicalism and the question of quality education in
predominantly black schools were not among them.
There is but one notable difference between southern and northern school
segregation, and that is in the degree of explicitness. State laws prohibiting racially
mixed schools in the South seemed important in 1954, but the importance diminished
with every passing year as civil rights claimants tested the forms of racism common to
social institutions in every region of the United States. One of those forms had been
dealt with in the Brown decision: the argument that racially isolated, racially
identifiable black schools could be as effective educationally as racially inclusive
schools. This question was explored and refuted in the South long before it made its
way north. And it was in the South that segregationists had perfected the critique of
desegregation remedies as mechanical and therefore harmful.
Thus, the chapter entitled "The Chairwoman " formulates the central subject of
Common Ground, and its interpretations guide Lukas into and through the terrain of
that subject, which is court-ordered school desegregation in Boston. Contrary to his
interpretations, Boston was never on the leading edge of that subject nationally. The
choice of Louise Day Hicks between advocating reforms consistent with the Brown
decision and resisting those reforms was not, as Lukas suggests, a fateful one for
Boston or the nation. Nor did her intransigence set into motion an evolving pattern
of rising white resistance to racial injustice in Boston. There were not ten elected
officials in any post from mayor to city councilman who were less resistant at the
time, and Boston politicians were carried into and out of office in those years on
waves of white fear and ignorance. Lukas's interpretation that the state legislature,
the State Board of Education, and later the state and federal courts failed to develop
rational policies fitted to northern conditions discloses the flawed quality of his social nr
history.
Lukas truncates the political history of school desegregation, even though it is his
central subject. He does not trace its evolving features as they moved northward from
Baltimore to New York City in the decade after 1954. He says of this evolution,
"When the legislature passed the Racial Imbalance Act on August 16, 1965, Massa-
chusetts became the first state in the Union— and to date the only one— to outlaw de
facto segregation in its public schools." That act was unique only technically,
however, and it was based on policy commitments made earlier in other states and
localities. Progress in reform was slow, to be sure, but it came earlier and faster in
New York, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and California than it did in
Massachusetts. The call for racial justice in Boston's public schools was neither novel
nor ahead of its time, and what distinguished white public reactions in Boston was
the uniformity, not the substance or the intransigence, of early maneuvers of
resistance and avoidance by white politicians.
The Judge
Federal District Judge W. Arthur Garrity, Jr., is the second of five public leaders
profiled in Common Ground. Chapter 14, "The Judge," follows the pattern set in the
chapter on Louise Day Hicks. It narrates his family history, which is used to explain
his motives and predispositions through a device Lukas calls the collective memory
drawn from ancestral legends, a sort of homemade variation on the theme of the
collective unconscious. It also gives a sketch of his career and his appointment to the
bench. While it provides a conjectural account of how and why Judge Garrity took
the actions he did in regard to Boston school segregation, the chapter is also a vehicle
for discourses on federal and state law, civil procedure, and the content of the court's
remedial orders. And just as Louise Day Hicks is given a choice by Lukas between
embracing or rejecting racial injustice, so Judge Garrity is pictured as choosing
between moderate compromise and rigid adherence to the prescriptions of the U.S.
Supreme Court.
There is another parallel: Mrs. Hicks's moving toward public leadership is depicted
as a kind of surprising emergence in her life history, whereas Judge Garrity's moving
toward a federal judgeship is described as a kind of fluke. We do not learn that
W. Arthur Garrity, Sr., served as a U.S. commissioner, for example. Garrity's clerk-
ship under Federal Judge Francis Ford is mentioned not as an indicative career
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commitment but as a time when Judge Ford "became almost a second father to the
young lawyer." Garrity's appointment as U.S. attorney for Massachusetts is not
connected to his achievements during earlier service as an assistant U.S. attorney but
is viewed exclusively as a by-product of his campaign services for John F. Kennedy.
Nor are those campaign services presented as if they grew up out of political
conviction and professional interest. Lukas tells us that they came about as a kind of
side play from social involvement in a clique called the Mystery Nighters: "The
Mystery Nighters were a classic John Kennedy crowd. ... So it was hardly surprising
that Arthur Garrity should join the Kennedy camp, working hard for Jack in the
1952 senatorial campaign." Lukas identifies the founder of the Mystery Nighters as
Eve Carey, daughter of the chairman of American Airlines. He does not get the
o^ kinship right. It is Mrs. Carey's brother, Albert Casey, who became chairman of
American Airlines. More to the point, Barbara and Arthur Garrity never attended
the parties given by the Mystery Nighters; the clique did not ever specialize in St.
Patrick's Day revels, as Lukas claims; and it was not the source or context for Arthur
Garrity 's decision to join the political campaigns for John F. Kennedy.
Each of the five public figures Lukas profiles is presented as a kind of demigod.
True to the Greek tradition, each is portrayed as having been elevated from the
ordinary by invisible acts of fortune, not by hard work and merit. Arthur Garrity's
work in the Kennedy campaign is thus questioned for its sincerity: "To this day,
Garrity insists that he had no ulterior motives in these labors." In reviewing the career
of an attorney who works on public election campaigns, how shall one interpret the
idea of "ulterior motives"?
Arthur Garrity's legal workmanship did not produce his appointment as U.S.
attorney either, says Lukas; rather, it stemmed from the ulterior motives of others.
He claims that the procedure adhered to for ordinary candidates for the post was
bypassed: "Garrity's appointment was rushed through the Senate Judiciary
Committee, past an unsuspecting Senate, and sped to the White House for the
President's signature. The following morning, the commission was put on a plane for
Boston."2 Thus do senior demigods— in this tale, John and Robert together—
conspire to lift mortals into their midst.
Nor, for Lukas, is Arthur Garrity's legal workmanship sufficient to account for his
later elevation to the federal judgeship. Garrity was "amply qualified," but he became
a judge because of a foiled effort by Edward Kennedy to appoint someone else.
Arthur Garrity filled in when a seamy scheme to pay off a political hack went awry.
In summing up Judge Garrity's performance on the bench, Lukas does not inform
us about the quality of his justice or mercy— only that he soon revealed himself to be
a puritan, obsessed by "a pathological fear of losing control." Earlier, Lukas writes
that what was special about Arthur Garrity's education at Holy Cross College was his
immersion in Thomistic philosophy. In an effort to account for a mind shaped by
Thomistic Catholicism yet characterized by the obsessions of an English Puritan,
Lukas suggests only that these incredible contradictions roiled about inside Judge
Garrity's psyche.
Again, consistent with Greek drama, Lukas notes that the god of chance awarded
the case of Morgan v. Hennigan 3 to Judge Garrity. That all cases are randomly
awarded is acknowledged, but Lukas tries to give this particular event the overlay of
a strange fate. By attributing a quotation to the chief judge of the district court,
Lukas remarks indirectly on the irony of the schools case being placed in the hands of
an Irish Catholic. We are not given the odds behind this event—we do not learn how
many of the judicial peers were Irish Catholics.
The chapter on Judge Garrity includes a capsule history of Supreme Court
desegregation decisions from 1954 to 1974, and on this stands the policy premise of
Common Ground. "By then, the line between defacto and dejure segregation had
become so fine as to be almost indistinguishable to the layman's eye. . . . But others
. . . thought it a distinction worth preserving: surely, a free society ought to defend
the right of its citizens to make genuinely private choices, no matter how
reprehensible. If government could abolish purely voluntary school segregation . . .
then what was to prevent it from requiring a private citizen to accept Irish, black, or
Portuguese guests at his dinner table?" Thus, the constitutional rights of private
citizens are pitted against the wrongs of "voluntary" racial discrimination. The wall
erected to prevent this had been eroded during twenty years of Supreme Court
decisions, and Judge Garrity was chosen by fate to go into the resulting breach.
The reader gets but a single sentence of quotation from the liability opinion given
by Judge Garrity in Morgan v. Hennigan. It is the sentence which concludes that the
Boston School Committee "knowingly carried out a systematic program of
segregation affecting all of the city's students, teachers and school facilities and . . .
intentionally brought about and maintained a dual school system." Although this is
the heart of the matter in Common Ground, the reader receives none of the facts on
which this conclusion was based. Nor do we learn much about the correctness of the
conclusion, only that Thomas Atkins of the NAACP thought highly of it and that the
court of appeals upheld it.
The tragedy enacted by Judge Garrity, Lukas assures us, lay not in the finding of
liability but in the remedies adopted to right those wrongs. Unidentified critics are
alleged to 'have said the judge wasted his energies on the liability opinion when he
should have spent them on the search for a remedy. Lukas fails to note that in school
desegregation disputes, it is the defendant who must fashion the first remedial
proposal and that it was in Boston that the School Committee refused to do just that.
The Phase I remedial plan for 1974-75 is depicted as a disastrous, vindictive
proposal intended to harm the parents and students of South Boston— or,
alternatively, as a drafting error in mechanical drawing by Charles Glenn, director of
the state Bureau of Equal Educational Opportunity. Two legends are narrated. One is
that Glenn's plan mistakenly linked South Boston High School with Roxbury High
School. Lukas quotes Harvard Law Professor Louis Jaffe, who warned early in 1973
that South Boston's "people are intensely hostile to blacks. ... I conclude, therefore,
that this part of the plan should be restudied." A better plan would, for this reason,
have sent South Boston's students somewhere else, Lukas claims, but the State Board
of Education rejected Jaffe 's warning.
Neither this nor any other feature of the Phase I remedial plan "caused" the violent
reactions that attended its implementation. Black students and faculty at Roxbury
High School, the facility nearest South Boston and one that South Boston girls had
attended across the many years when it functioned as Girls' Trade High School,
accepted the incoming white students peacefully. South Boston High School became
the staging area for violent resistance to the Phase I plan, a resistance which then
spread to a few other schools. The entry of black students into South Boston High
under any plan would have triggered a violent explosion of white racism in 1974, a
point that Lukas does not make.
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The second legend narrated by Lukas is that Judge Garrity ordered the Phase I
plan into place because he had not studied it and because he had nothing else to
adopt: "With barely three months left before the state plan was scheduled to go into
effect, the judge felt he had no recourse but to adopt that plan as his first-stage
remedy . . . while he began devising a permanent remedy." In fact, Judge Garrity had
several alternatives. He could have delayed a remedy until January or September
1975. He could have revised parts of the Glenn plan. He could have required the
School Committee to file an immediate proposal of their own, as was done within
eighteen days in the case of every school district in Mississippi. The options closed to
him were to do nothing; to adopt a gradual reform such as integrating one grade level
a year; to revert to an open enrollment plan (already adopted by Boston and used to
further segregation); and to adopt a metropolitan consolidation plan. He adopted the
Glenn plan as temporary because it had been endorsed by the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts; because it affected only four in every ten schools and was
thus milder than most federal court remedies; and above all because by so doing, he
could give the Boston School Committee a chance to demonstrate an affirmative
commitment to a permanent proposal of their own devising. The Glenn plan was
implemented with negligible tension or conflict in seventy-five of the eighty schools it
affected, and many of the problems associated with it stemmed from Boston School
Department failures in guiding its implementation.
The tragedies narrated in Common Ground arose, according to Lukas, from the
juxtaposition of hidden flaws in individual character and events that conspired
against fulfillment of what would be best for ordinary people. The book's chronicle
relies therefore on the selection of events which seem best suited to express the
adverse twists of fate. For example, Lukas writes that Judge Garrity began to devise
his own permanent remedy long before one was due from the School Committee.
This is simply not true. He also reports that Garrity's first two choices for the role of
court expert were Thomas Pettigrew and Paul Ylvisaker, but "both turned him
down." In fact, Judge Garrity never conferred with Pettigrew, and in his meeting with
Ylvisaker, he never broached the subject.
Edward McCormack is featured by Lukas as one of the four masters appointed by
Judge Garrity to make findings of fact and to recommend courses of remedial action.
McCormack, according to Common Ground, developed a compromise plan early in
1975 that would have brought peace as well as racial justice to Boston. The other
three masters are mentioned only once, although two of them, Charles Willie and
Francis Keppel, had deep expertise in desegregation, while McCormack had never
dealt educationally or legally with the issue. "Although the judge had adopted ... a
'team' approach, Eddie McCormack was clearly first among equals, the team's
unofficial captain." In fact, the presiding master was Jacob J. Spiegel; and while
McCormack was the most dominating as well as the most creative personality on the
team, he was not the captain. He did not create the elements of the masters' proposal;
did not appraise its educational consequences; did not do the legal or demographic
research on which it was based; and did not investigate the prospects for federal aid.
These and other vital tasks were carried out by other team members. McCormack,
meanwhile, specialized in testing a wide range of interest groups and organizations in
order to assess and cultivate their support for the proposal, and he set the pace of the
planning effort.
According to Lukas, McCormack created the Masters' Plan in the course of
private negotiations with leaders from all parts of Boston. The result was a "skillful
balancing of the constitutional requirement for racial integration with the craving of
many parents for neighborhood autonomy. Moreover, Eddie McCormack had woven
a powerful mystique around the plan. It seemed to promise both justice and order, an
attractive combination to the afflicted city. That expectation mobilized a broad
middle ground behind the plan." It is in this statement that readers find one of the
keys to the title of the book. McCormack, the brilliant master of the art of the
possible, says Lukas, drew a map of the middle ground where peace would have
prevailed over racial warfare, had Judge Garrity not succumbed to pressure and
spoiled the map by revising it. It was this fateful error, Lukas claims, which unleashed
the second wave of furies in Boston in 1975 and 1976.
But the errors in Lukas 's reconstruction of these events are so great as to obscure
what actually occurred after the masters retired from the case on April 2, 1975, six
weeks after they had entered it. They are such serious errors as to render Common
Ground suspect as a chronicle of the chief subject it aspires to analyze.
Just a few of the mistakes can be noted here. One of the gravest is the statement
that Judge Garrity revised the Masters' Plan by increasing the number of students to
be bused from 14,900 to 25,000. The actual estimate by the masters was 18,900, but
they tucked some 4,000 of these into an appendix as magnet school riders and, hence,
"voluntary" transportees. Judge Garrity put the two types of riders together and
added those to be transported for reasons of traffic safety. He also gave parents an
opportunity to advise on busing plans, with the result that many lobbied successfully
to add bus transportation for their children. The number bused in September 1975
thus was about 24,000.
Lukas also neglects the record of events in court. Several weeks after the masters
retired, the Boston School Department, black plaintiffs, and the State Board of
Education all repudiated the enrollment data on which the Masters' Plan was based,
including that plan's estimates of numbers of students to be bused. More accurate
data were supplied in response to a later court order, but the impact of invalid
information on the dispute over a remedy was enormous at this time.
Contrary to the chronicle in Common Ground, all of the substantive features of the
Masters' Plan were retained by the court. These included citywide cross-busing, with
the exception of East Boston; magnet schools in abundance; guidelines for
community school districts, which consisted of clusters of facilities falling within
firmly bounded but enlarged subcommunities; the pairing of schools with businesses,
colleges and universities, and cultural agencies; uniform grade structures; and the
closing of fire-unsafe, severely dilapidated buildings. What the court changed in the
light of new evidence was 10 percent of the boundary lines around community
districts. The masters could not have comprehended the necessity for these changes.
They served the court for six weeks and then retired, while the judge, his two experts,
and one special law clerk, as well as the nine parties to the litigation, continued on
long after.
Lukas reports that when the permanent court order came out,
Ed McCormack was so angry he couldn't bring himself to read the newspapers the
next morning. He felt betrayed. After encouraging them to build consensus for a
plan, the judge had kicked the props from underneath it. If the plan had needed
refinement, why couldn't Garrity have handed it back to them for "fine tuning"
instead of simply overriding them? Now people could say, "I supported the
89
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Masters' Plan, but I can't support the judge's." Garrity claimed to have retained 90
percent of the original plan, but McCormack was sure that the revisions, modest
though they might be, had destroyed the plan's mystique and therefore its efficacy.
He could not guarantee that his plan would have brought peace to the city, but he
was certain that the judge's remedy would ensure more violence.
These may well have been McCormack's views. No one worked harder over the
period of a few weeks, moreover, than did McCormack in his efforts to persuade key
groups to back the Masters' Plan. He had been tireless, influential, and credible in his
attempts to engineer a consensus around that plan. In the process, he brought back
only one compromise he persuaded the other masters to make in order to render their
plan acceptable, and that concerned a real-estate aim of Mayor Kevin White,
g^
McCormack's accomplishments lifted morale among the team of planners and gave
them hope that consensus might extend beyond the federal courthouse to the divided
and hostile segments of public leadership.
The quality of his contribution cannot be overstated, but anyone who was present
at the court hearings in April and May of 1975 (as McCormack was not) would have
realized that the Masters' Plan was incapable, as any plan would have been at that
time, of establishing a common ground. Fine-tuning was quite beside the point.
Planners and attorneys for the School Committee attacked the Masters' Plan in
nearly every particular, condemning it as infeasible, educationally undesirable, and
based on errors of fact. Attorneys for black plaintiffs critiqued the plan within an
inch of its life. The State Board reached back to Charles Glenn and their former
consultant, John Finger, to file an eighty-page critique. Mayor White's corporation
counsel, Herbert Gleason and Kevin Maloney, gave no advocacy, and opposition
came as well from the Boston Teachers Union, the Boston Association of School
Administrators, El Comite for the Hispanic parents, and the Home and School
Association, all parties to the litigation at the time. That Judge Garrity navigated
these seas of division and reached the port called for in the Masters' Plan was the
most extraordinary achievement in the remedial phases of the case.
Lukas suggests that Judge Garrity failed to approve the McCormack compromise
out of some flaw in character, some Thomistic or puritanical penchant for caution
—
some inherent inability to embrace the practicalities of compromise. This, he writes,
converged with the evolving rigidities of the Supreme Court and with the raging
cross-pressures blowing across Boston. In this plot, both flaw and context destroy the
last remaining chance for racial peace.
This is storybook stuff, however. It was fashioned locally as part of the means for
exculpating Bostonians from the implications of their own uncompromising
commitments to the status quo. Lukas serves as the chronicling outsider who collects,
sifts, and weaves a more complete fabric of exculpation out of the stuff of these local
legends.
The Cardinal, the Editor, and the Mayor
Three other public figures are profiled in Common Ground. We meet Humberto
Cardinal Medeiros at the center of the book, Globe editor Thomas Winship at the
two-thirds point, and Mayor Kevin White near the climax of the long story.
Each is provided with a biographical profile and these profiles vary in length,
depending on how many details were available on the record and how much friends
and kin were disposed to tell Lukas. Where the biographical detail is thinnest, as with
Cardinal Medeiros. Lukas fills in with the history of the church in Boston. The
coverage of Cardinal Cushing and his era is so extensive that reviewers from other
regions or countries might think he is still leading the archdiocese.
This is not the result of sloppiness on Lukas 's pan. His aim in selecting his public
figures was to bracket the political action around the school desegregation story. But
Cardinal Medeiros figured faintly in that action. Not only did he concentrate on the
performance of his religious office, but the white ethnic hostility shown toward him
immediately on his arrival in Boston was so grievous and so obviously a by-product
of the racism mobilized by the antibusing movement that there was little he could do.
Unlike an investigative reporter, however. Lukas does not pin down or explicate
the sources of the hatred and threats displayed toward the cardinal. Consistent with pi
his dramatic format, he stresses the view that Cardinal Medeiros was unable to rise to
the occasion. His chapter becomes one of recording what Medeiros did not do; the
meetings he did not attend: the visits he did not make to Charlestown and South
Boston. Most important for the book's account of race relations. Lukas finds that the
cardinal's formal prohibition against giving white students refuge in parish schools
was flawed with loopholes and weakly enforced by the archdiocese. Thus, like
Winship and White. Medeiros failed to act effectively when the moment of decision
arrived, according to Lukas. who further claims that when the court ordered its
Phase I remedy in 1974. the cardinal's endorsement of it was halfhearted.
The reasoning about the performance of Cardinal Medeiros is subjective conjecture
on the part of a journalist who was unable to penetrate the walls of privacy
surrounding archdiocesan leadership in secular matters. The cardinal's actions are
interpreted from a place remote from the locus of action, and they are contrasted
invidiously with what the deceased Cardinal Cushing might have done— a form of
what-if historiography. This conjectural exercise diverts the reader's attention from
the political action among Catholics when desegregation took place— the homes and
neighborhoods of the white ethnic enclaves where parish priests faced into the winds
of racist violence, a story Lukas documents well in his chronicle of the lives of the
McGoff family in Charlestown but does not link to the chapter on Medeiros.
Mayor Kevin White, according to Lukas. was a professional politician who proved
himself "light as a feather." Common Ground gives the reader a picture of a man
who. as a youth, barely graduated from high school and college: who struggled
through law school; and who eked out a meager living as an assistant district attorney
in his earliest adulthood. As with Louise Day Hicks. W. Arthur Garrity. Jr.. and
Humberto Medeiros before him. Kevin White is profiled as one who came
unqualified into public life by reaching high state office at a tender age with little
support from his politically influential family; in short, yet another twist of fate.
In spite of inauspicious beginnings, then, the Kevin White of Common Ground
becomes a professional politician who builds a powerful, resiliency adaptive political
machine which appears for many years to be highly appropriate to the volatile
conditions of Boston. In addition, we are asked to believe, perhaps beyond credulity,
that as mayor. Kevin White had little to do with members of the Vault, the private-
sector committee that shapes big-corporate policy toward the city and that bankrolls
projects and public leaders on critical occasions. This sounds credible until we learn
that White carried out vast downtown redevelopment projects and always found
political support and big money when it was needed most and seemed hardest to
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come by. We also wonder how this flawed and barely qualified mayor succeeded in
recruiting a cadre of exceptionally gifted young aides into service at City Hall and
how, with them, he put into place more than a dozen innovative policies and
programs of city revitalization in the years from 1968 to 1974.
Kevin White emerges gradually in the chapter devoted to him as the most nimble,
inventive, and ethnically inclusive mayor Boston had elected and reelected in perhaps
the last century. Lukas concludes, however, that when the challenge of school
desegregation befell White in 1974, he botched the midnight test of leadership. The
explanation Lukas offers is to be found in the chapters on Colin Divers, a White
aide, as well as in the chapter on the mayor. It is, in sum, that Kevin White reached
out for higher office and came within an inch of nomination as the Democratic
Q7
candidate for vice president of the United States. Earlier, dreams of the governorship
danced in his head, and later, the presidency itself seemed possible. His gifted aides,
we are told, watched with despair as White's attention was diverted from the conduct
of Boston's affairs. For this dream of self-aggrandizement, White suffered the fate of
Narcissus.
In place of a researched account of the conditions under which Mayor White
changed between 1974 and 1976 from an advocate for racial justice and adherence to
constitutional law into a vigorously defiant opponent of court actions, Lukas focuses
on trivia. He records stories about White telephoning the Garrity home during a crisis
of racial violence and getting turned away— as if a White would really believe he
could hold backstage conversations with a federal judge in the midst of complex civil
litigation. Lukas even suggests, without having examined court documents, that
Judge Garrity attached the mayor as a defendant in the case as a vindictive reaction
to the telephone calls. The course of White's movement from the liberal center of the
controversy toward the outer edges of the antibusing ideology is not chronicled;
instead, the Kevin White in Common Ground fades away before our eyes. We get
snippets about his success in being reelected in 1976, but the chapter ends with the
legend of his political self-destruction. Once again, the opportunity to explore the
forces at work within a part of the electorate, a part committed to defiant and even
violent resistance to desegregation of the public schools, is sacrificed in favor of the
interpretation of flaws in the character of an individual leader.
The chapter on Thomas Winship, "The Editor," departs from the essentially
docudramatic treatment of the other four leaders. Here, Lukas deals with the career
of a newspaperman and with the impact of school desegregation on the Boston
Globe, a newspaper whose traditions and content he understands from earned
professional familiarity with urban journalism. Common Ground is at its best in this
chapter. It is one that will be reprinted for years to come for use in college courses on
journalism.
The story of the editor coheres with other parts of Common Ground in one
important respect, however: it is devoid of an account of why and how the attacks
against the Globe became so violent and were so long-sustained. The response of
Winship and others on the Globe is covered superbly. How the paper's leadership
fumbled along the path toward their calvary, contributing to their own pain, links
this chapter to others as well. Just what it was that spawned the South Boston lion of
violence and what made it roar with such telling effects is left unexplained, however,
and it becomes hard to link the fortunes of the Globe to the diverse and volatile
subcultures of Boston.
Ordinary People
Stories of demigods are empty unless they include stories of the mortals in whose
midst they dwell. As Sam Walter Foss wrote in his poem "In Memoriam," "The plain
man is the basic clod/ From which we grow the demigod;/ And in the average man is
curled /The hero stuff that rules the world."
In his Author's Note, Lukas writes, "The three families at the center of my story
were not selected as statistical averages or norms. On the contrary, I was drawn to
them by a special intensity, an engagement with life, which made them stand out
from their social context." No reader would expect three families to provide an
adequate sample of Boston's ordinary people, but no reader can believe either that
they were chosen simply for their "special intensity."
The Divers give the reader a picture of the young urban professionals of early Baby
Boom vintage. They are upwardly mobile members of the white upper middle class
who were touched somewhat by the civil rights and other countercultural movements
of the sixties. They want social change and are willing to work for it, and they believe
in racial equality. The McGoffs offer the sharply contrasting values of the
downwardly mobile Boston Irish working class; they are not only rooted in
Charlestown, they are stuck there by economic forces, and they want it to be
culturally changeless. The Twymons give the reader a picture of the life and times of
the bitterly hard-pressed, black single-parent household. With a touch of middle -
classness in her past and with church connections into the civil rights revolution, Mrs.
Twymon not only extends her imagination in many directions but also articulates her
experiences with vigor and precision. Happily for Lukas, the Divers and the
Twymons share the South End, and the Twymon daughters share Charlestown High
School with two of the McGoff children.
Just as happily for the sake of plot structure, the Divers are connected with City
Hall and later the State House, giving readers a small but select window into politics
and social policy. The McGoffs have political-protest ties to the movement inspired
by Louise Day Hicks, and their church life takes us through part of the portrayal of
the archdiocese as well as into two local parishes. While the Twymons lack these
direct connections with Boston leaders, Mrs. Twymon has associations with Martin
Luther King, Jr., and with several local clergymen caught up in the northern struggle
for minority rights in housing and education, thus giving balance to the plot and the
way it seeks to connect heroes, however badly flawed, with ordinary people. A reader
from a distant place might infer that Boston life is infused with extraordinary
political activism among its residents, an inference contradicted by the evidence on
voter registration and turnouts, but Lukas does not intend or assert this. Every plot
has its inherently circumstantial contrivances.
Charlestown and the South End and a public school within each of these
neighborhoods become settings for examining the interactions between ordinary
people, public leaders, and the politics of social and economic change. They are good
choices. Both neighborhoods are old and have well-documented histories that can be
recounted engagingly by Lukas. In this way, prospective millions of Americans and
foreign visitors who have heard of Bunker Hill or who have seen the Boston Pops
Orchestra perform on television can identify with something about these settings.
Although Common Ground is the story of school desegregation in Boston framed
among many subplots, only two public schools are treated in any detail in the book.
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fully researched, and provides a glimpse of Lukas s journalistic abilities at their be s
Had he done nothing else during his years on this project, this chronicle would
vindicate his effort. Across the growing shelf of books and ankles about the Boston
Public Schools, nothing equals this reconstruction of daily life in and around the old
Ingh school for precision, relevance, and selection of detail. Indeed, no other sour: t
save the liability opinion of the federal court offers a fuller account of the nature and
jM>
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iir jiiftwc of racial segregation and discrimination and how these ideologies and
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Among the few details overlooked by Lukas are some which would have linked the
narrative of Chariestown High to the school desegregation remedy itself, however.
The rationale behind the assignment of students is not described, for example: that is.
End and -ay are within a few short miles of
one another; that the oveiuowding deciicd by Lukas made it possible for all
Charkstown youth to attend Charkstown High: and that the old high school facility
was being 7erlaced. thanks to desegregation, by a fine new building nearby. Indeed.
nowhere in Common Ground is there reference to the fact that the maximum busing
distances for students assigned to community district schools were shorter, by court
order, than the distances traveled by students in the suburban and rural districts of
Lukas also leaves out of Common Ground any record of the numbers of student s
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7 irents rather than being allowed to travel the short distances to schools across the
Charles River, in contrast to the black students who risked their Lives daily for tv
years in commuting to schools in Charkstown. Nor does he note that, with the
advent of desegregation. Charkstown parents and students had new. greatly enlarged
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throughout the city.
Common Ground shows with sharp clarity how a small fraction of the parents of
Charkstown organized to protest and resist school desegregation. It describes vividly
how these parents, including Ahce MeGoff. mobilized and then carried out the
protest demonstrations not only of adults but of the youth inside Chariestown High
SchooL Whik the demonstrations in the streets were tightly controlled by the poL. c
white students inside the high school engaged in mob terrorization of black students
as well as in daily, minor harassments consisting of ostracism and individual
confrontation.
In the final chapter of his book. Lukas also shows how desegregation and such
efforts as an integrated Upward Bound summer program induced the beginnings of
racial tolerance in Lisa McGoff. one of the student leaders during the two years of
violent protest. The reader can imagine, with the help of Lukas. a future in which the
next generation of Charkstown families will refuse to serve as pawns in \iolent
attacks against black children, youth, and parents. Lukas departs Charkstown on a
note of hope. His story doses before subsequent episode ding well into 1983
suggest that violent white racism lives on in those young aduh ""Townies" who
withdrew from school in the 19"
There are white demigods as well as antiheroes in Common Ground, but no
Bostonian black demigods are presented. Not only do the Twymons lack heroes, but
every hope, every effort expended by all but three members of their family is crushed
under the careening wheels of Boston's white policy and economy. According to
Lukas, the federal court remedy made a mockery of Rachel Twymon's quest for a
decent education for her children. She does not call it a mockery and she gives her
daughter sound reasons for attending Charlestown High, but Lukas makes it seem
hopeless for them. The dreams inspired by the Brown decision and by Martin Luther
King, Jr., are pressed into ashes of despair by every event he records in employment,
housing, welfare assistance, small-business development, criminal justice, and public
education. Even within this larger context of oppression, Cassandra Twymon's days
at Charlestown High, which receive the most sustained illumination by Lukas, read
like the history of a civil rights movement whose outcomes are an exercise in
collective madness brought on by court orders. g<-
The alleged betrayal of white parishioners by Cardinal Medeiros is harder for
Lukas to particularize because he lacks an insider's account of life within the church.
Still, his emphasis on this allegation casts a pall second only to the alleged failure of
Judge Garrity to embrace the McCormack compromise. The McGoffs believe their
cardinal and his priests have abandoned them at every turn in the course of the
desegregation crisis. Alice McGoff finds parochial school havens for two of her
children, and two local priests remain sympathetic. Yet one of the cardinal's
specialists in urban affairs, Father Michael Groden, not only accepts Judge Garrity's
invitation to head a panel of citizens to monitor desegregation but does so while he
continues to live in a parish rectory hard by the McGoffs' neighborhood.
One of the sympathetic priests urges the cardinal to visit Charlestown early in the
fall of 1975. The cardinal refuses, and many weeks later a reporter quotes him as
saying, "They wanted me to go to Charlestown. ... To get stoned. They're looking
for blood and they'd love to see me dead in the streets." The offense this statement
gives Alice McGoff nearly exceeds Lukas 's ability to record it, while the truth value in
the cardinal's outburst goes unappraised. In preference to documenting the full scope
of hatred and threats directed at the cardinal by some white parishioners, Lukas
speculates on how Portuguese Catholics share very grim visions of the Christian peril.
He notes cross burnings, death threats, hate mail, the demise of money offerings, and
the relentless defiance shown toward church doctrine, but he is drawn dramatically
toward a notion of a Portuguese persecution complex.
The Fallowness
In a television program of the 1960s entitled "The Naked City," the announcer began
each week's telecast with "There are eight million stories in the Naked City. This is
one of them." Unlike New York, Boston does not have 8 million stories to chronicle,
but it does have at least six hundred thousand. J. Anthony Lukas has written up a
dozen of those and has organized them around three families, five public leaders, and
one class-action litigation that affected nearly everyone. His stories do not illuminate
any one moral generalization. They are not explained in whole or in their parts.
There are fragments of social theory scattered throughout the book, but these are
not reconciled with one another, nor are they used to develop an explanatory
overview. One theory, borrowed from an urban economist, says that public-policy
changes often trigger perverse secondary effects which are worse than the problem the
policies addressed originally. Another, taken from psychiatrist Robert Coles, says
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that by limiting racial justice reforms to the central city, reformers neglected white
suburbia and thus pitted poor white against poor black children— a kind of variation
on the idea of perverse effects. A third theory advanced by Lukas as his own
proposes that the American ideals of community and equality are radically
incompatible with one another in an advanced industrial society.
These theories would merit appraisal if Common Ground were a scholarly treatise
or a contribution to social science, but it is not. Lukas holds to the ideals of the
journeyman reporter. He is in search of the facts about what happened in Boston
between 1968 and 1978, to the extent that what happened is contained in the stories
he has selected for coverage.
Dramatically engaging as the story of each family may be, no evidence from them
q, explains at all adequately the story of school desegregation. The Divers have some
firsthand knowledge about a single elementary school in the South End, but that is
the extent of their involvement. The Twymon children attend several different schools
before and during desegregation, but Lukas captures the story of but one of these,
Charlestown High. The McGoffs, two of them at least, carry us into parts of the
citywide protest movement, but most of their experience is confined to a few years at
Charlestown High.
The thousands of filings in Morgan v. Hennigan go unexamined in Common
Ground. There is no review, and there are no quotations, from the public record of
the litigation except for a sentence or two from the federal court's liability opinion.
The contents of the Globe's coverage of race relations and the court case are alluded
to but neither digested nor reviewed. Sourcebooks such as Schools on Trial: An
Inside Account of the Boston School Desegregation Case4 and "/ Respectfully
Disagree with the Judges Order"5 are not quoted or cited. The first of these
summarizes the record of the court case and its implementation; the second reprints
and excerpts the full range of media accounts of the dispute.
Much is gained by intensifying the focus on what journalists call the human
interest elements in Common Ground, but much is also sacrificed. A reader cannot
learn what transpired in the course of state and federal court proceedings over the
years 1969 to 1978, and what a reader can learn is factually unreliable. And a reader
cannot learn what in particular it was that the Boston Globe did in reporting on the
dispute that may have contributed to attacks on the paper, its staff, and its facilities.
In addition to generating a kind of vacuum around the particulars of policy actions
and media actions, Lukas avoids the question of how unique or representative Boston
is among cities. Shall we read about Boston because its happenings are unlike those
that took place in other American cities in the same years? This cannot be the intent,
surely, because the militancy of opposition to school desegregation in Pontiac,
Louisville, Pittsburgh, Kansas City, Indianapolis, and San Francisco, to mention
places from diverse regions, was just as fierce and just as dependent on the arguments
summarized in the book Disaster by Decree. 6 So, too, when Lukas reports on how
white youths attacked Rachel Twymon's sister and family when they moved into a
white neighborhood, we recall similar attacks in Detroit, Chicago, and Philadelphia.
Can it be that we are to take a case study of Boston as representative of urban
America? There is a solid grain of truth in this idea, but Lukas does not consider it
seriously, and his emphasis upon the historicity of Boston and its Bunker Hill
distracts the reader from considering it. Journalists, unlike social scientists, are not
burdened by disciplinary responsibility for gauging whether their reports are more or
less generalizable, and one cannot fault Lukas for working within his professional
tradition. Journalists also do not have to assess whether the stories of one or two
neighborhoods within a city are indicative of the stories of other parts of the same
city, and indeed we learn little from Common Ground about South Boston, the core
of resistance and defiance toward racial justice, let alone a dozen other neighboring
subcommunities.
Unlike a sociological monograph or a novel by E. L. Doctorow, Common Ground
should be appraised on two counts: Is its chronicle of what happened accurate, and is
the point of view through which the chronicle is interpreted adequate to the scale of
the events themselves?
On the first count, Common Ground records many facts and many statements
offered as facts which are in error. A surfeit of details and conjecture is sometimes gj
used in preference to a selective decision about which facts matter. No one needs, for
example, to pile a persecution complex on top of the facts that Cardinal Medeiros
suffered from diabetes and high blood pressure and was received by some
parishioners with manifest hostility in order to provide an account of his despair. Nor
does one need an account of the Mystery Nighters in order to learn how Arthur
Garrity came to work on campaigns for John Kennedy. Many details are included
because they add to the human interest factor, no doubt, but the standard of selection
and verification is made of rubber.
On the second count, Common Ground is much weaker. If we are to read a
hundred pages about violent reactions to changing racial policies, for example, the
factual details presented should point toward something that is causally
commensurate with the scale of the reactions. No evidence is mustered in the chapters
on the five leaders to suggest that one or all of them caused the bloodshed, terror
tactics, sniper attacks, or mob violence documented in the book. In his book, The
Boston School Integration Dispute, 1 anthropologist J. Brian Sheehan narrates the
same bloody record and finds it necessary to invent a conspiracy between Yankee
Brahmin business leaders and "black politicians" in order to account for it. His
conspiracy theory is another myth, to be sure, but at least it has scope.
The family chapters cannot account for the violence, because none of the families is
situated to offer an interpretation. The McGoffs, or Alice and her daughter Lisa at
least, are deeply implicated in desegregation protest activities, and their story is made
exceptionally vivid for this reason. They were eager to tell Lukas their recollections
years afterward in order to justify their conduct— indeed, perhaps, to memorialize it
with pride.
Mrs. Alice McGoff paid little attention to the school dispute until the spring of
1973, when she attended a meeting and heard a Dorchester mother warn that
"indiscriminate mixing of blacks and whites would be a disaster. The three R's will
be turned to Riot, Rape, and Robbery, she said.' ... To Alice, the idea of sending her
children to a school halfway across the city when they had a perfectly good school
right across the street was utterly ridiculous. Moreover, what she knew of conditions
in Roxbury strengthened her resolve . . . she knew it wasn't safe over there." That is
the full reconstruction of her knowledge and attitudes. It certainly does not suffice as
motivation for what followed.
Kevin White toured a half-dozen cities in the North in 1976 and spoke eloquently
on what he called "the disaster of busing in Boston." At that time he was still mayor.
It was not until 1982 that he made public his conviction that Boston was a
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particularly racist city, but when he was running for office he could not have been
expected to account for "the disaster" in these terms or even in terms of voter
attitudes. His own public reputation as a political liberal, while rusting away, made
this impossible. And Edward McCormack, with his close ties to the politics of South
Boston, his lifelong loyalty to his uncle, John McCormack, and his real-estate as well
as political interdependence with Kevin White, did not tell Lukas about the intensity
of rejection accorded the "McCormack compromise plan" by South Boston's political
leaders, William Bulger and Raymond Flynn.
In a speech at the Kennedy Library, J. Anthony Lukas said no one should make
Judge Garrity a scapegoat for the wreckage wrought by Bostonians, yet his own
sources and his record of their accounts in Common Ground do precisely that. They
assert that the liability opinion took too long in coming; that it failed to distinguish
between northern and southern forms of racial segregation; that the judge adopted
the Phase I remedy hastily and without prudent forethought; that his Phase II
remedy was both rigid and draconian; and that his intrusion into School Department
operations stimulated racial strife. Judge Garrity is not the only source of the
problem: Louise Day Hicks is deemed a political anomaly rather than the symbol of
protest. Cardinal Medeiros, we are told, was a poor choice on the part of a key
person in the Vatican. Kevin White fails to keep his eye on Boston when his
leadership is needed most. Tom Winship makes the Globe cosmopolitan and
objective just when some readers yearn most for parochialism and for coverage that is
sympathetic to protesters.
It is not Lukas who invents the exculpation of those who acted out the violence in
the citywide movement that came to be named ROAR. His role is that of the visiting
stranger who gathers the wool of exculpation heaped up by others. If Boston is the
unique, historical Cradle of Liberty its citizens believe it to be, can the relentless
hostility toward black parents and students and a small band of white moderates be
reconciled with the image? Will stories about flawed leaders help restore the loaded
surfaces of conventional ideology which cover over the realities of life near Bunker
Hill? If the staff and offices of the Boston Globe are subjected to gunfire, can it be for
reasons grounded in the ignorance and fears of subscribers who cannot bear to read
what the Globe reports? Or shall the same surfaces of convention be smoothed over
by the excuse that the Globe lost touch with its subscribers?
Common Ground leaves such questions unanswered. We are left to answer for
ourselves why some white students at Charlestown High, goaded by their parents,
snubbed, terrorized, and attacked black students inside and outside the school. We
cannot learn from reading this book how opposition to racial desegregation came to
be carried to such extremes.
Notherners were shocked when similar extremes flared in Little Rock in 1957; but
there, remember, a white school board and many administrators and teachers had
tried to initiate desegregation, only to be blocked and attacked by Governor Faubus
and others in the State House. Is it possible that the hands that rocked the Cradle of
Liberty were culturally identical to the hands that blocked the schoolhouse door at
Central High School in Little Rock nearly thirty years ago? None of Lukas's sources
explore this question.
Something which has large potential value or utility but which is being unused is
often called fallow. The criminal-court record in the rape of a white woman by
Freddie Twymon is chronicled in minute detail in Lukas's last chapter on the
Twymon family. Its inclusion in Common Ground is presumably justified at one level
of meaning by the author's effort to track the lives of every family member. At
another level of meaning, however, this story discloses the fallowness of the book. We
learn what heinous assaults took place but not why, whether on the level of
individual psychology or on the plane of Boston and American society.
Were the sacrifices and gains accomplished by those who built the civil rights
revolution wasted on Freddie Twymon? Is this story, by any assessment the grimmest
individual behavior recounted in Common Ground, indicative of something, or is it
finally meaningless in its blanketing import of despair? To what extent does the story
sound an echo for the ROAR speaker who equated the black community with rape
and robbery?
It was Martin Luther King, Jr., who revived Gandhi's dictum that poverty itself is
the greatest violence that human beings wreak upon one another, but Lukas does not
tell his readers what was done to Freddie Twymon that he would act so rapaciously.
Nor does he probe what was done to Lisa McGoff that she would lead others to
terrorize black students. She remembers feeling sickened by being a part of the
protest march in which her schoolmate bludgeoned black attorney Theodore
Landmark with the staff of an American flag while he was crossing City Hall Plaza
on an innocent mission. By her own account, she was sickened not so much by the
violent hatred expressed as by the realization that its criminality would be used to
discredit her protest.
Lukas 's theory of community versus equality defines community in narrow terms
characteristic of closed, ultratraditional neighborhoods organized around ethnic and
class homogeneity. Surely the ideal of community refers to something grander than
tribal attachments to a place. In any event, it was not the quest for equal educational
opportunity that led to the disintegration of closed neighborhoods in Boston and
other big cities. That breakdown of barriers began during the dislocations of the
Great Depression and the explosion of social and economic change during World
War II. Lukas gives us many details about Charlestown and the South End in
support of this history of deep and irreversible change, and he shows us how the
McGoffs were stranded in a backwater housing project left over from the 1930s; but
he does not make the mental connections essential to comprehending how racism,
white and black together, is forged in the crucible of a profit-centered, privatistic
urban culture.
The word fallow also refers to ground which has been plowed and harrowed, but
not cropped. Thus, Lukas plows the ground of Boston, but the meanings of the lives
and times that he treats go unharvested. Nor is the ground he works on common in
the sense in which we think of locating the common ground in a dispute. On this
issue, he is quoted in an interview in the Boston Globe: "The book is about human
beings, all who are right by their own certain lights. ... I try to leave it to the reader.
I would like the reader to be as confounded ... as I was. I was constantly shuttling
back and forth, never knowing where my sympathies were."
The question is not one of Tightness or wrongness, however, nor of sympathies, but
of why events went the way they did in Boston. One cannot answer this by recording
what a few respondents say they did and how they felt about it. Not even the events
themselves can be described validly by this method.
A part of the answer to the question comes from the effects of racism. Central to
racist thought has been the view that the stereotyped qualities attributed to black
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Americans by some white Americans are biologically innate. These stereotypes have
functioned to rationalize discrimination and segregation, the methods by which
blacks are oppressed, confined, and isolated. Decades of racist rhetoric prefigure and
drench the issue of school desegregation in Boston. Pieces of that rhetoric are picked
up by Lukas in his chronicle of Charlestown and in his report on Codman Square in
Dorchester. Generally, however, the substance, pervasiveness, and uses of racist ideas
and actions go unexamined in Common Ground. Those who can afford to buy the
book may include some readers who keep their stereotypes under firm control as part
of a custom of civility, but Common Ground is not likely to increase their awareness
of the damage this ideological virus can do, whether leashed or unleashed. Colin
Diver experiences such an awareness when he feels the agonizing pressures of
defending his property and family from intruders. The pain of recognizing his own
racism is part of what motivates him to relocate to Newton from the South End. This
is one of the few contexts in which a major aspect of the thoughtways of many
Bostonians is presented, however.
Another explanation of events in Boston surely lies in the political culture of the
city. It was organized for nearly a century around wards that preserved and
patronized the closed, vertically structured, white ethnic enclaves so brilliantly
described in Street Corner Society more than forty years ago. Six of these wards were
Irish and two were Italian. Ordinary citizens at the base of each enclave had ward
bosses and other minor politicians who mediated their claims with the big bosses
downtown. Public offices, including school principalships and custodial jobs, were
bought and sold in a white marketplace where money, votes, and loyalties were the
currency of exchange. Black, Hispanic, and Asian households had no place in the
political culture, which lay like a seamless blanket across all services that involved
public finance, real estate and facilities, and taxation.
From 1950 to 1970, hundreds of thousands of households relocated from Boston to
the suburbs and out of the region as well. The aging white population that was left in
the central city grew puzzled, angry toward the relocators and about themselves, and
increasingly antagonistic toward politicians who concentrated less on the
neighborhood wards and ever more intensely on the profits to be taken from
downtown renewal, gentrification projects, and, in the 1960s, federal investments in
urban assistance.
Politicians who, like Louise Day Hicks, Albert O'Neil, Fred Langone, and John
Kerrigan, continued to bank on the white ethnic enclaves found themselves cut off
from the newer, more profitable politics of renewal and finance under Mayors Collins
and White. New school construction was a part of the new politics, beginning in 1954.
Crumbling and fire-unsafe facilities were left in operation as part of avoidance of
conflict with the enclave dwellers, while new buildings were placed in ways that
reinforced redevelopment. Some enclaves, such as East Boston and South Boston,
were left out of the redevelopment process, except where Massport cut into real estate
in order to expand the airport and harbor areas.
Black Bostonians were immaterial, at least until 1965, to the grinding impasse
facing white families who could not make it out of the crumbling public housing
projects left over from 1937 and the endless miles of wooden, arson-prone walkups
nearby. Until their numbers grew, blacks were a small, divided minority stuffed away
toward near invisibility when viewed from South Boston. The march on Selma could
be watched on television, but it was far away. When black parents organized and
dared to press claims for the education of their children, however, the challenge to
white ethnic families became apparent. What was happening nationwide in the
Kennedy and Johnson years came to Boston. For some white families, affirmative
action and the other trappings of equal treatment seemed to be part of the same plot
that caused suburbanization, urban demolition, job insecurity, and the shredding of
such old enclaves as the West End and Charlestown. That the demolition cut an even
broader swath through black Roxbury provided no comfort.
Unlike Buffalo, a sister city whose economy had been more severely decimated by
the Great Depression, Boston hosted no sizeable, radically deprived white ethnic
subcommunity like the Polish Americans. The Boston Irish, poor and struggling as
they were in the aftermath of World War II, could take pride in the success of their
rise to political hegemony. When a federal court ordered school desegregation in
Buffalo, the occasion offered renewed and enlarged opportunities for Polish-
American children as readily as it did for black Americans, and after some years of
tension, both groups worked collaboratively toward that end. Boston, meanwhile,
had already undergone commercial transformation. It was not a rusting
manufacturing and steelworking city like Buffalo, and by 1970 it had become a
contender for at least a basement slot in the world-class city competition as a
financial, medical, scientific, and higher educational center. Its political structure had
turned toward federal concerns with the Kennedys, and its mayors and their aides
had gone to Harvard or M.I.T. What some of the Boston Irish saw in the racial issue
of public schooling was but one more occasion for a downward slide in their
hegemony.
If we can begin to answer why events happened the way they did, we may also
speculate on whether the violence of 1974 and 1975 could have been prevented. This
essay has argued that the claim that better litigation, better remedial plans, and better
efforts by city and state authorities could have stemmed the tide of strife is specious.
Nor would a different cardinal and a different editor of the Boston Globe have made
a difference, either.
Kevin White in 1974 was probably as competent a mayor as a mayor of Boston
could possibly be. He could have committed to the cause of racial peace the full
weight of his machine, but only in the certain knowledge that all would be lost for
him and for the middle managers of his organization. Some American cities have had
political leaders who have made such a commitment, but they can be counted on the
fingers of two hands. His successor's investment in the politics of antidesegregation
would have been greater than his ever became, substantial as that was by 1976. The
alienation between the white enclaves and City Hall was in itself too extreme by 1970
to have made such a choice an effective one, however courageous.
The violence might have been prevented had the federal government developed and
carried out a national urban policy. Such a policy was beginning to be framed as
early as 1960, parts of it by leaders from Boston, but it was drained away by the
Vietnam War and the privatistic politics of the Nixon years. Given the initial impetus
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, we can speculate that distributive justice, coupled
with effective housing, transportation, and education programs, would have made
school desegregation in Boston a concomitant of urban reconstruction rather than the
result of a court dispute. Many big cities of the North, including Boston, were within
reach of redressing racial wrongs in public education as part of new school
construction and other programs of the times. By the time of the inner-city riots and
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burnings that followed the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., that opportunity
had decayed.
When we reflect upon opportunities missed, it becomes obvious that no
contemporary central city in the United States can be interpreted through the ancient
visions of the Greek city-state, the self-sufficient fortress cities of medieval Europe, or
the shining city on a hill of the Puritans. Boston today is a small dot in the great
nexus of an international commercial and environmental ecosystem, as it has been
since at least 1945. As the world and the nation go now, so goes Boston, a dwindling
dot in an expanding metro area. The ignorance, fear, and anger of those who tried to
lock the gates of Charlestown, Dorchester, or West Roxbury are the mental and
emotional debris from which an urban legend of innocence is spawned. J. Anthony
Lukas fails to find the facts which exist in the midst of that debris and which put the
rule of equal treatment above the custom of special advantage within the closed
neighborhood, no matter how hardened the crust of local custom has become. Alice
McGoff, Lisa McGoff, and Freddie Twymon, together or apart, cannot be
exculpated. They are what the later decades of the American twentieth century made
them become. With the Boston Public Schools, as with Watergate, justice finally
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